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1. Introduction 
The advance of processing technology has led to a rapid increase in IC design complexity. 
There are now more than thousand million transistors integrated on a chip, and the increasing 
trend is expected to continue until 2020 or later. This creates the design productivity gap 
between IC design (typically 20% per year) and IC manufacturing (over 40% per year), and 
this gap is becoming wider and wider. To close this gap, IP (intellectual property) reuse 
emerged as the most significant design technology innovation in the past decades. IP 
companies, third-party libraries, and industry organizations such as the VSIA (Virtual Socket 
Interface Alliance) have created high expectations for the value and reusability of design IP.  
The IP reuse in the reuse-based design methodology is rather different from other reuses 
such as media, devices to produce artifacts. The reuse of components, designed for a class of 
applications, is a method to reduce the design-effort, which is well-known from software 
design for a long time already. In the field of IC design, the reuse of blocks has been 
practiced in design houses mainly in form of an evolution of existing products. Due to 
shorter product cycles and rapidly increasing product complexity, many design companies 
will more and more refer to module cores from outside. During the process of the transfer of 
design blocks from the original provider to the integrator, intellectual property issues have 
to be seriously considered. At the same time, some essential issues for IP reuse are outlined: 
design quality, documentation, security, support, and integration (Thomas et al., 2001). As 
suggested in the “Reuse Methodology Manual for System-On-A-Chip Designs” (Keating & 
Bricaud, 1998), an example process of integrating IPs and doing physical chip design can be 
broken into the following steps: 
Selecting IP blocks and preparing them for integration; 
Integrating all the IP blocks into the top-level RTL; 
Planning the physical design; 
Synthesis and initial timing analysis; 
Initial physical design and timing analysis, with iteration until timing closure; 
Final physical design, timing verification, and power analysis; 
Physical verification of the design. 
There are many solved or unsolved issues need to be addressed for IP market: friendly 
interface between IP provider and IP user, design-for-manufacturing, design-for-test, 
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design-for-reuse, IP standardization, rules for IP exchange, and so on. IP reuse is based on 
information sharing and integration. Therefore piracy will also have much easier access to 
the IPs. The IP piracy affects the IP vendors, chip design houses as well as system 
manufacturers adversely by depriving their revenue and market share. As a result, recent 
trends of IP piracy have raised serious concerns among the IC design community.  
In response to these trends, IP protection becomes crucial to both IP vendors and IP users 
and becomes one of the key solutions for industrial reuse-based integration. Although 
sometimes the lack of mechanisms for IP protection becomes barriers to increase design 
productivity, there have been significant advances from both industry and academic. 
Especially the VSIA’s white paper on IP protection (VSIA, 2000a) and physical tagging 
standard (VSIA, 2000b) has now been widely adopted by semiconductor and EDA industry. 
Numerous protection techniques are proposed by researchers both from industry and 
academia. There exist three forms of IP protection techniques: tagging, fingerprinting, and 
watermarking. The idea of tagging proposed by Marsh & Kean is to provide a “security tag” 
for the IP core which can easily be detected off chip using an external receiver called as 
“wand” (Marsh & Kean, 2007). The approach is vulnerable because the tag can be easily 
removed by someone if he/her knows some information about the tagging. Bolotnyy & 
Robins use PUFs (Physically Unclonable Functions) to create aboard RFID (Radio Frequency 
Identification) tags to protect ICs from cloning (Bolotnyy & Robins, 2007). The security is 
really improved. However the PUF design is so complicated that the manufacture is hardly 
reachable. Majzoobi et al. proposed a “Lightweight Secure PUFs” with the new structure in 
low area, power, and delay overheads. The appeoach facilitates easy security versus 
implementation cost trade-offs (Majzoobi et al., 2008). There are also other variants in PUF 
researches, such as implementation of PUFs exploiting physical characteristics other than 
timing and delay information of silicon circuits. Ravikanth et al. Proposed an optical PUF, 
which uses the speckle patterns of optical medium for laser light (Ravikanth et al., 2001). 
Coating PUFs and acoustic PUFs measure the capacitance of a coating layer covering an IC 
and the acoustic reflections of a token, respectively (Skoric et al., 2005; Tuyls et al., 2005). 
Among these techniques, watermarking is the most extensive mechanism implemented at 
multi-levels of IC design procedure. Primitive watermarking, also known as data hiding, 
embeds data into digital media for the purpose of identification, annotation, and copyright. 
The rapid development of digitized media and the internet revolution are creating a 
pressing need for copyright enforcement schemes to protect copyright ownership. 
Numerous techniques for data hiding in digital images, videos, audios, texts and other 
multimedia data have been developed. All these techniques take advantage of the limitation 
of human visual and auditory systems, and simply embed the signature to the digital data 
by introducing minute errors. The transparency of the signature relies on human’s 
insensitiveness to these subtle changes. For detail survey, refers to (Gang & Potkonjak, 
2003). Especially, watermarking techniques in VLSI domain protects IP cores, CAD tools as 
well as algorithms from illegal reuse.  
CAD tools and algorithms are protected as traditional software by mechanisms such as 
licensing agreements and encryption. Despite the lack of enforcement of licensing 
agreements and the security holes of encryption protocols, these protections do not 
provide the ability to detect IP piracy (Lin et al., 2006). The rare technique that detects 
possible CAD tool and algorithm piracy is the forensic engineering approach proposed by 
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Kirovski et al. (Kirovski et al., 2000). It enables the identification of solutions generated by 
strategically different tools and algorithms. They simply check the given solution for the 
properties that the algorithm clustering has been performed and claim that the solution is 
obtained by the algorithm that has the best fit. The poor application to distinguish 
different algorithms as well as the requirement of candidate algorithms and computing 
resource is the lack of this technique. So the need for effective CAD tools and algorithms 
protection becomes vital and urgent. CAD tools and algorithms protection are not in the 
scope of this book, our work focuses on watermarking techniques for the protection of 
reuse IP core. We review the representative watermarking techniques and evaluate their 
performance for both ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) and FPGA (Field 
Programmable Gate Array) designs. 
Fingerprinting technology is a complementary to watermarking due to the demand of 
ensuring the rights of both IP provider and IP users. The main challenge of fingerprinting 
technique is how to create numerous IP cores with the same function for different IP users. 
The common approach is to acquire each IP user’s signature and repeat embedding it into 
the entire design to create high-quality solutions from scratch within reasonable amortized 
design cost. 
To the best of our knowledge, the first IP fingerprinting technique is published by Lach et al. 
(Lach et al., 1998). Their approach is based on the solution by partitioning an initial solution 
into a large number of parts to provide different fingerprinting realizations (a restricted 
FPGA mapping problem). Unfortunately, the technique cannot be applied if the design do 
not have natural geometric structure. Also it has relatively low resilience against collusion 
attacks due to the identical global structure and the time overhead for creating fingerprinted 
solutions is relatively high. Andrew et.al proposed a generic fingerprinting methodology 
that applies to arbitrary incremental optimization/synthesis problems on an watermarked 
initial “seed” solution to yield different but functionally identical fingerprinted IPs. The 
approach enhanced collusion resiliency with low runtimes but different solutions are not 
guaranteed (Andrew et.al, 1999). Gang and Miodrag proposed a fingerprinting technique 
which uses arbitrary optimization on the problem formulation superimposed additional 
constraints to produce numbers of distinct solutions with high quality. The run-time 
overhead for generating many solutions is almost zero (Gang & Miodrag, 2004).  
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. We first review the related works of 
watermarking techniques. Analyze the representative watermarking techniques, introduce 
watermarking performance evaluation function, and show experimental results for 
watermarking techniques of ASIC. Followed give a simplified FPGA watermarking 
investigation and estimation. Finally we have a conclusion for overall work. 
2. Watermarking performance evaluation 
Referencing viewpoints by VSI Alliance (FallWorldwide Member Meeting, 1997), a state-of-
art watermarking-based IPP technique should be: 
1. Maintenance of functional correctness. 
2. High-credible; coincidence probability, the probability a non-watermarked design 
might coincide by accident with a watermarked one should be low enough. 
3. High-security; watermark should be in the integrity or can be extracted under attack. 
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4. Low embedding cost.  
5. Low overhead. 
6. Traceable. 
According to the requirements of watermarking, a complete methodology for watermarking 
performance evaluation should be established. Unfortunately, limited to our knowledge, 
there is no comprehensive evaluation function for IP watermarking techniques so far. The 
only literature published for watermarking investigation is accomplished by Abdel-Hamid 
et al. (Abdel-Hamid et al., 2003). However, they only compared performance of the 
approaches from their embedding cost, overhead, probability of coincidence, and security. 
There was no more deeply analysis and evaluation for the watermarking techniques.  
In the context, we introduce representative watermarking techniques and evaluate their 
performance for the two usual IC forms: ASIC and FPGA respectively. 
2.1 Watermarking performance evaluation for ASIC 
From watermarking construction style, there are almost two methods for watermarking 
ASIC IP cores. One focuses on introducing additional constraints on certain parts of the 
solution space of synthesis and optimization algorithms. Another is adding redundancies to 
the original design.  
From VLSI design process, pre-processing watermarking methods and post-processing 
watermarking methods are discussed. Pre-processing techniques embed watermark before 
the synthesis tools are applied to solve the watermarked problem. Post-processing 
techniques firstly solve the original problem without any watermarks. The solved solution 
will be altered sequentially based on the watermarking constraints. According to design 
process, watermarking techniques at behavioural-level, structural-level, physical-level, and 
algorithm-level are proposed. 
There may be some shortfalls or defects for a certain watermarking technique.  It becomes 
an important work to evaluate the performance of a watermarking technique because the 
approaches may bring influences to the origin. So it is impending to build methodologies 
and functions for watermarking performance evaluation. 
2.1.1 Watermarking technique review 
In this section, we firstly review a few representative watermarking techniques constructed 
at different design levels. Then analyze them form a few essential aspects: embedding cost, 
coincidence probability, security, and tracing cost.   
2.1.1.1 Physical-level watermarking 
Kahng et al. firstly proposed the constraint-based watermarking methodologies based on 
the usage of available tools which solves NP-hard problems (Kahng et.al, 1998). The 
algorithm adds extra constraints to such solutions that would make it yield the new 
watermarked design. They validated the approaches in pre-processing and post-processing, 
respectively. The pre-processing flow provides a method that adds constraints by involving 
segment widths, spaces, and choice of topology. They applied the watermarking by 
encoding a signature as upper bounds on the wrong-way wiring used to route particular 
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signal nets. The post-processing flow provides a method that encodes a signature as 
specified parity of the cell row within which particular standard cells must be placed. 
Narayan et.al provided a method for embedding a watermark by modifying the number of 
vias or bends of the nets in a design (Narayan, et.al, 2001). There were 12~13% expense in 
the number of vias and wire length which is unpractical in real life. The author also 
proposed a post layout watermarking method which smartly changes route directions by 
setting obstacle and rerouting (Nie, et.al, 2005). There was no extra wire length overhead 
and the incremental watermarking time is acceptable. Other techniques at physical design 
level are also proposed (Min & Zhiqiang, 2004; Irby et.al, 2000). 
For physical design watermarking, we choose the most representative technique proposed 
by (Kahng et.al, 1998) for evaluation instance. According to the published results, the 
extra routing CPU run time for watermarking is about 9.00%; increased wire-length and 
via number (watermarking overhead) are 0.58% and 0.55% respectively, sum is 1.13%; the 
coincidence probability geometrically reduced to the constraint number, from 1.1e-8 
(nearly 10-3 for 20 constraints) to less than e-85 (nearly 10-25 for 320 constraints). From their 
analysis, the approaches can prevent “ghost signatures” and forging attack due to 
enough-long constraints and message encoding. They also showed the result from 
tampering with placement and routing watermark which indicates solution quality 
degrades much faster than signature strength. It proves that tampering does not appear to 
be a viable form of an attack. 
2.1.1.2 Behavioral-level watermarking 
Torunoglu et.al and Oliveira introduced a similar watermarking-based copyright protection 
technique of sequential functions at behavioral design level (Torunoglu & Charbon,2000; 
Oliveira, 2001). The algorithm is based on adding new input/output sequences to the finite 
state machines (FSM) representation of the design. It extracts the unused transitions in a 
state transition graph (STG) of the behavioral model. These unused transitions are inserted 
in the STG associated with a new defined input/output sequence, which will act as the 
watermark. The main advantage of this kind approach is the ability to detect the presence of 
the watermark at all lower design levels. Torunoglu and Charbon performed exhaustive 
search only in one case due to the extreme computational complexity of this method. The 
CPU time in this case was 1.0 second for an area of 2.33-k gates, but it increases 
exponentially according to their computation formula. The coincidence probability of 
watermarking is from 10-7 to 10-34, averagely 10-11. The watermarking overhead (Extra area 
of modified FSM) is from 0.2% to 143%, average is 23.77%. It will be much larger if the 
expected watermark becomes longer. The number of I/O pins which is used to create 
sequence to insert watermark is not very long, so the approach’s resistance to “ghost 
signatures” attack is not as strong as expected. They proved the “tampering” attack will not 
successful under various assumptions. Unfortunately, because there is no encryption for the 
watermarking, the approach is weak to “forging” attack. 
2.1.1.3 Structural-level watermarking 
There are few watermarking works at structural-level. Kirovski et.al developed a 
watermarking approach to protect EDA tools and designs at the combinational logic 
synthesis level. The user-specific watermarking instance is soluted by imposing constraints 
to the original logic network, where the constraints are uniquely dependent on author’s 
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signature (Kirovski et.al, 1998). Cui and Chip-Hong also proposed the similar approach by 
resynthesizing the “master design“ to meet the application constraints. 
We select the first appraoch as representative for structural-level watermarking performance 
evaluation. From their result, the runtime for the watermarking was controlled within ±5% 
of the program execution runtime. The average likelihood of watermarked solution 
coincidence is less than 10-13 with the overhead of 4%. Because the adopted watermark 
constraint length is short (5-inputs), its resistance to “ghost signatures” attack is likely low. 
They proved that the attacker has to perturb great deal of the obtained solution to tamper 
the watermark while preserving solution quality, like to develop a new optimization 
algorithm. For “forging” attack, it is less efficient than trying to tamper the signature in a 
top-down approach and it is more impossible in a bottom-up approach due to the one-way 
function encoding. 
2.1.1.4 Algorithm-level watermarking 
There are rare approaches at the algorithmic level. Chapman & Durrani proposed a Digital 
Signal Processing (DSP) watermarking scheme (Chapman & Durrani, 2000). The algorithm 
is based on the ability of designers to make minor changes in the decibel (db) requirements 
of filters. In this approach, the designer of a high level digital filter encodes one character (7 
bits) as his/her hidden watermark data. Then the high level filter design is divided into 7 
partitions where each partition is used as a modulation signal of one of the bits.  
The authors did not discuss the strength of their approach or the probability Pc that the 
design might coincide with a non-watermarked design. The approach as well depends on a 
very low data rate, just one character (7 bits), which makes it really unpractical to be used in 
an industrial environment. The approach is also missing a clear way to track and extract the 
watermark at lower levels. Therefore, we think the approach is incipient and do not evaluate 
its performance. 
2.1.2 Watermarking performance evaluation function 
As described in the context, we consider performance evaluation of watermarking 
techniques from five aspects: embedding cost, coincidence probability, overhead, security, 
and trace cost. The components of watermarking performance are illustrated in Fig.1. We 
formulate watermarking technique performace P using the following function: 
 ( _ , _ , , , _ cos )P F Em Cost Coin pro Overhead Security Trace t  (1) 
Where P is a function with six variables: Em_Cost, Coin_Pro, Overhead, Security and 
Trace_cost. Em_Cost represents watermarking embedding cost which usually means the 
additional wire length or vias for watermarking represetation. Overhead represents how 
long EDA tools runt for watermarking process. Coin_Pro represents the probability that the 
watermarked design coincided with a non-watermarked one. Security represents strength of 
watermarking technique resists to various attacks. Trace_Cost displays the cost retrieving 
watermark from a protected IP design that can be considered almost the same to the 
embedding cost. Maintenance of functional correctness is not considered as a factor of the 
function because each watermarking technique in the market should at least satisfy this 
requirement.  
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Performance of Watermarking
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Fig. 1. Watermarking Performance Components 
Obviously, lower watermarking cost leads to high-performance watermarking technique. 
Therefore watermarking performance is reverse to embedding cost. Similarly, watermarking 
performance is reverse to coincidence probability, overhead, and tracing cost. Instead 
watermarking performance is proportional to its security which must be concerned. We give 
a function fi and a weight to each component, equation (1) can be formulated as: 
 1 2 3 4 5( _ ) ( _ ) ( ) ( ) ( _ )P f Em Cost f Coin pro f Overhead f Security f Trace Cost                (2) 
In practice, watermarking tracing cost is almost equal to watermarking embedding cost, so 
formula (2) can be simplified as: 
 1 2 3 42 ( _ ) ( _ ) ( ) ( )P f Em Cost f Coin pro f Overhead f Security             (3) 
Each part of formulation (3) is related to both watermark constraints size and watermarking 
method. Consider process of watermarking-based IP protection, we evaluate the 
performance of watermarking techniques in such rules: 
The watermarking IP protection process is implemented by either intrusive software or an 
incremental implementation of EDA tool. So the additional CPU run time of the 
implementation is considered as the embedding cost. Generally, watermarking 
identification needs some extra circuits. We take the increased wire-length and (or) via 
number as watermarking overhead. It is considered that the security of watermarking 
techniques is related with its resistance to attacks. There is a brief introduction of 
prototypical attacks referred in (Kahng et.al, 1998). The attacks include “ghost signatures” 
finding, tampering, and forging. To find “ghost signatures”, hacker may try a brute-force 
approach to find a signature that corresponds to a set of constraints that yields a convincing 
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proof of authorship Pc. However, this brute-force attack becomes computationally infeasible 
if the threshold for proof of authorship is set sufficiently low. e.g., Pc≤2-x (x is the length of 
constraints). So it is easy to prevent this type attack just by enlarging the length of signature 
(watermark). As an alternative, attackers may select re-solving every subsequent stage of the 
watermarking process to forge author’s signature. Generally, Specific changes that attacker 
makes to the final solution will likely correspond to (1) local perturbations of the solution to 
the watermarked phase, or to (2) global-scale transformations such as those which exploit 
asymmetry of the design representation. It is critical that common watermarking technique 
has the resistance to such transformations. Tampering attacks might not be able to ruin the 
proof of authorship before they significantly degrade the quality of the final solution. 
Finally, attacker may select to forge author’s signature. To finish this work, he needs a 
signature that he can convince others belong to author. If a signature corresponds simply to 
a text message, he simply chooses a text message resembling one that author would use. 
However, such attacks can be easily prevented by using a private key encryption system for 
watermark generation. We analyze the security of watermarking techniques from the above 
three aspects, and give a quantitative performance evaluation. 
2.1.3 Watermarking analysis summary 
Through the investigation and analysis, performance of various watermarking techniques 
is summarized in Table 1. There are total six columns each display the item of 
watermarking performance. The first column displays watermarking type. The second 
and the fifth column are the watermarking embedding cost and tracing cost which 
represent the increased CPU runtime corresponding to normal IC design process. The 
forth column of “Overhead” represents the increased percentage of wire length and via 
number. In the fifth column of “security”, there are 3 sub-columns: G, T, and F which 
represent the resistance to “ghost signatures”, “tampering”, and “forging” separately. The 
value of “+” means the method has resistance to such attack, while the value of “-” means 
no resistance or resistance is really weak. 
 
Watermarking Em_Cost Coin_Pro Overhead 
Security 
Trace_Cost 
G T F
Physical 9.00% 10-3~10-25 1.13% + + + 9.00% 
Behavioral expensive avg: 10-11 23.77% + + - expensive 
Structural 5.00% < 10-13 4.00% - + + 5.00% 
Table 1. Performance summary of watermarking techniques   
2.1.4 Evaluation results 
We evaluate the representative watermarking algorithms from five items: embedding cost, 
coincidence probability, overhead, security, and tracing cost. According to the investigated 
results, we calculate each sub-value in the scope (0, 1). Finally we accumulate all the value as 
the performance evaluation by using formula (3).  
Performance of watermarking technique is related with the run time of watermarking 
process. The more time consumed, the more watermarking technique is ineffective. We 
define sub-function f1 as: 
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 1
_ cos
( _ ) 1
_ cos
Em t
f Em Cost
Design t
    (4) 
Where Design_cost displays the original design cost. If Em_cost (embedding cost) is too 
expensive to exceed Design_cost, the value of function f1 will be equal to 0.  
If the coincidence probability of a watermarking techniques is sufficiently low (for example, 
less than 10-3), f2 function can be set as: 
 2( _ ) 1f Coin pro    (5) 
The overhead of watermarking (increased wire length, extra via, etc.) degrades the 
performance of the design. The function f3 can be written as: 
 3( ) 1
Overhead
f Overhead
Total
    (6) 
Where Total is the total cost for the original design. 
There are three factors impact the watermarking security: the resistance to “ghost 
signature”, “tampering”, and “forging”. We think that no matter which factor is satisfied, 
the watermarking security gets 1/3 value augment. The f4 can be written as: 
 4
1
( )
3 3
N
f Security N     (7) 
Where N is the number of satisfied factors. 
Substituting the formulations (4), (5), (6) and (7) into formulation (3) and the of set 
Design_cost and Total to 1, we have: 
 2 (1 _ cos ) (1 ) / 3P Em t Overhead N               (8) 
We prepare three schemes to evaluate performance of watermarking techniques: (a) Balance 
evaluation where each item weights are the same, namely ǂ=ǃ=Ǆ=λ=0.2; (b) Cost emphasis 
evaluation where the weights of cost and overhead are set double to others, namely 
ǂ=Ǆ=0.25 and ǃ=λ=0.125. (c) Security emphasis evaluation where security weight is set 
double to others, namely λ=2/6 and ǂ=ǃ=Ǆ=1/6. (All the weights obey: 2ǂ+ǃ+Ǆ+λ = 1) 
Based on formulation (8), we calculated the concrete performance value for the several 
watermarking techniques. The results are shown in Table 2. 
 
Scheme Physical WM Behavioral WM Structural WM 
Balance 0.9214 0.4858 0.9053 
Cost_Emphasis 0.9268 0.3989 0.8867 
Security_Emphasis 0.9345 0.5159 0.8656 
Table 2. Performance of watermarking techniques 
The first column show the evaluation schemes mentioned above: Balance evaluation, Cost 
emphasis evaluation, and Security emphasis evaluation. The second, the third and the forth 
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column show evaluated performace value of different watermarking techniques in various 
test schemes. From the result, we understand performace of physical watermarking 
representative is high, then structural watermarking representative, and behavioral 
watermarking representative is relatively low, no matter the scheme. From the curves in 
Fig.2, we can understand the comparison more intuitively. 
 
Fig. 2. Performace illustration of watermarking techniques 
We introduce functions to evaluate watermarking techniques and hope this work can 
provide a standard candidate for researchers to evaluate their watermarking techniques. 
Although performace of various watermarking techniques is different, even the weak 
technique has its advantages. In future, researchers may develop stronger watermarking 
techniques by combining the advantages of different level watermarking techniques to 
prevent any IP piracy attempt from happening. 
2.2 Watermarking performance evaluation for FPGA 
Before the FPGA being watermarked, a signature should be prepared. The signature may be 
a short ASCII-text, which identifies the owner of the core. The string is then hashed and 
encrypted to generate a seed of watermark. Then the watermark is produced from the seed 
with a pseudo random generator like RC4. 
Fig.3 gives an example of FPGA watermarking design flow. As shown in the figure, there 
are three types of FPGA cores: Source-cores, netlist-cores and bitfile-cores, corresponding to 
the design levels. Source-cores are delivered in HDL or C language. There are very flexible 
to synthesize for many target technologies. Netlist-cores have a medium flexibility because 
they have been fixed on a target technology. Bitfile-cores are very inflexible since they can 
be used only for a specific device. 
Daniel & Jurgen had an accurate evaluation of watermarking methods for FPGA-based IP 
cores from functional correctness, hardware overhead, transparency, verifiability, difficulty 
to remove, and proof strength of authorship (Daniel & Jurgen, 2006). They divided 
watermarking techniques into two categories from their construction: additive methods and 
constraint based methods. In this chapter, we introduce recent FPGA watermarking 
techniques and estimate their performance under certain criteria. 
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Fig. 3. FPGA watermarking design flow and IP core 
2.2.1 Additive methods 
Additive methods in FPGA design are watermarking procedures where a signature is added 
to the functional core. The watermark is not embedded into the functional core yet be 
masked as a part of the core.  
There exist no publications about additive watermarking for source cores protection 
although it is possible to write an additive source component into the core. However it isn’t 
an applicable watermark strategy because one can also remove this component easily. 
Most additive watermarking methods for netlists just watermark the design by introducing 
redundant logic to the circuit. Moritz et.al presented a novel approach to watermark FPGA 
designs by converting functional LUTs (Lookup Tables) to LUT-based RAMs or shift 
registers prevents deletion due to optimization (Moritz et.al, 2009). The resource overhead 
for watermarking is tiny, generally less than 5%. The method is transparent to EDA tools 
because the watermarking is performed after the usual netlist generation. The suspected 
design can be verified only when the extracted bitfile is not encrypted. The authorship can 
be detected without requesting additional information from the producer. However the 
watermark can be easily removed by reverse-engineering and the authorship will dispear. 
An approach for watermarking bitfile-core is implemeted by embedding the signature 
into unused look-up tables (John et.al, 1998). The signature will be hashed and coded with 
an error correction code (ECC) to be able to reconstruct even if some lookup tables are 
tampered. After the initial placement and routing, the number of unused lookup tables 
are determined. The ECC code is split into the size of the lookup tables and additional 
LUTs are added to the design. The watermarked design is obtained after being re-placed 
and re-routed. 
The approach was improved (John et.al, 1999) by using many small watermarks whose size 
is the exact size of a lookup table. The small watermarks are easier to search relatively. 
However, the published watermark positions in verification process make the watermarking 
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technique easily attacked. Futhermore, Lach et.al improved the approach to a fingerprinting 
technology by encoding the fingerprint into the position of the mark in the tile (Lach et.al, 
1998). 
The watermark consumes low hardware overhead because the unused lookup tables in the 
original design would remain empty. The approaches provide a strong proof of authorship 
and are transparency to EDA tools. The methods are verifiable because it is possible to 
determine the position of the watermark in a tile. On the contrary, the watermark is alos 
easy to be remoed or overwrited. 
2.2.2 Constraint based methods 
The constraint based watermarking methods apply to solutions of hard optimization and 
constraint-satisfaction design problems. It is centered around the use of constraints to “sign” 
the output of a given design synthesis or optimization. The solutions of a given optimization 
instance that satisfy these constraints have a watermark embedded in them and provide a 
probabilistic proof of authorship. The less likely that randomly chosen solutions are to 
satisfy these constraints, the stronger the proof of authorship is. The coincidence probability 
Pc is given by the following formula:  
 /c wP n n   (9) 
where n is the number of solutions which satisfy only the original constraints and nw is the 
number of solutions which satisfy both the original and the watermarking constraints. If Pc 
is very small, the solution provide a strong proof of the watermarking existence. A 
watermark’s resistance to attacks is inversely proportional to an adversary’s ability to 
manipulate it without resolving a given optimization problem from scratch.  
Darko & Miodrag proposed an approach for a HDL core protection using a watermarked scan 
chain (Darko & Miodrag, 1998). At first all registers will be sorted to be assigned a sequential 
number. A pseudo random sequence is generated from author’s signature to select registers 
according to a certain algorithm. The first K selected registers are chosen for the first register in 
a chain, where K is the number of used scan chains. The variation of the scan chains for 
different signature can be used to detect the watermark. Unfortunately, an injudicious chosen 
of test chain could result in more routing resources overhead. The approach is transparent to 
the synthesis tools because the signature is added to the HDL core. The watermark can be 
verified easily only when the scan chains can be accessed from outside of the chip. Some 
deletion of watermark results in corruption of the scan chain. In additional, a strong proof of 
authorship can be achieved by using a large number of registers in scan chains. 
An approach to protect netlist cores is implementing by preserving certain nets in the 
synthesis and mapping step (Kirovski et.al, 1998). Some nets are chosen from the sorted nets 
of design according to a signature. These nets are prevented from elimination by the design 
tools by connecting to a temporary output of the core. Additional logic is inserted to connect 
the new outputs together to reduce the amount of the additional outputs. The design with 
new outputs can be seen as the result of constraint based watermarking. The additional 
logics for watermarking require some resource overheads. This approach is transparent to 
EDA tools because the choice of preserved nets for watermarking can be done before the 
synthesis process. The watermark can be verified by comparing the given netlist with the 
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original one. However, it is impossible to verify the watermark from a bitfile. The security of 
this approach is insufficient because the additional logic is easy to remove by re-
synthesizing the design. Furthermore, although the probability of coincidence is really low, 
forging watermarked design is possible which results in weak authorship proof. 
An incremental placement and routing or timing constraint is applied to watermark FPGA 
bitfile-cores.  
As an alternative, a watermark can be embedded by placing configurable logic blocks 
(CLBs) in even or odd rows depending on the constraints (Kahng et.al, 1998). The resource 
overhead for watermarking is very low and even tends to zero because the placement is 
altered marginally. The approach is transparent because the watermarking stage is 
performed before placement implementation. The CLBs can be corresponded to the 
signature uniquely by enumerating them form the top left corner. Then the watermarked 
design can be verified with only the given bitfile. It is nearly impossible to remove 
watermark from the given bitfile because the CLBs are tightly connected with each other. 
This approach has a strong proof of authorship due to the large amount of CLB position 
candidates for watermark embedding. 
Another proposed method is to add constraints to the router. The constraints make the 
router route a net with some unusual routing resources like “wrong way” segments, in 
which the net goes to a wrong direction and then back in the right direction to form a 
backstrap. The net can be verified as a watermark net due to its special geometry. The 
routing resource for watermarking is too minor to be neglected. The approach is also 
transparent to EDA tools because constraints are added before invoking routing. The 
watermarked design can be verified with the known strategy and the unique nets. It is easy 
to remove the mark by wrapping up the constraint nets and rerouting it again if someone 
knows the routing information and the watermarking algorithm. The proof of authorship is 
not very strong because the watermark is ambiguous and easy to remove or tamper. 
A watermarking approach by setting additional timing constraints between registers is 
proposed in (Kahng et.al, 2001). The timing constraints for the selected paths may split into 
two separate constraints, each have a new constraint.  
Another approach selects the uncritical paths and adds new timing constraints on them 
(Adarsh et.al, 2003). The last digit of the time delay is reset depending on the watermark. 
For example, a path has a delay of 10.64ns. If the corresponding watermark bit is ’1’, the new 
time delay of this path is set to10.61ns, if the corresponding watermark bit is ’0’, the delay is 
set to 10.60ns. 
These approaches for watermarking need no resource overhead. They are transparent 
because additional constraints are added before invoking the routing tool. These approaches 
are difficult to verify so that it no use to talk about their authorship proof and attack 
resistance. However designers can create different bitfiles from the same design which are 
useful for fingerprinting. 
2.2.3 FPGA watermarking validation 
As mentioned in (Daniel & Jurgen, 2010), when considering a finished FPGA products, there 
are five potential information sources can be used for extracting a watermark: configuration 
bitfile, ports, power consumption, electromagnetic (EM) radiation, and temperature. 
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The bitfile can be extracted by wire tapping the communication between the PROM and the 
FPGA. Some FPGA manufactures provide an option to encrypt the bitstream which makes 
communication monitoring useless. However, it is possible to read out some information 
stored in RAMs or lookup tables to finish verification. Another approach is to employ 
unused ports which is limited only at top-level designs and impractical for IP cores. 
The method called “Power Watermarking” can force patterns on the power consumption of 
an FPGA as a covert channel to transmit data to the outside. Related works shown in (Ziener 
& Teich, 2008) and (Ziener et.al, 2010) indicate the clock frequency and toggling logic can be 
used to control such a power spectrum covert channel. The resulting change in power 
consumption can be extracted as the signature from the FPGA's power spectrum.  
With almost the same strategy it is also possible to extract signatures by raster scanning 
electromagnetic (EM) radiation of an FPGA with an EM sensor (Thomas & Christof, 2003). 
Unfortunately, it becomes unpractical since modern FPGAs are delivered in a packaged 
shape which decreases the EM radiation. 
Finally, a watermark might be read out by monitoring the temperature radiation which is 
similar to power and EM-field watermarking approaches. There is only one commercial 
watermarking approach which reads a watermark from an FPGA taking up to 10 minutes 
(Kean et.al, 2008). 
3. Conclusion 
In this section, we first reviewed several classical IP protection methods such as tagging, 
fingerprinting, and watermarking. Then we investigated representative watermarking 
techniques of ASIC at different design levels. We proposed functions to evaluate 
watermarking techniques from the under aspects: embedding cost, overhead, coincidence 
probability, security and tracing cost. The evaluated results show that the performance of 
physical watermarking technique is high, structural watermarking technique is medium, 
and behavioral watermarking technique is low. We also summarized watermarking 
techniques of FPGA core protection and validation methods from three forms of FPGA: 
source code, netlist, and bitfile. 
From this work, we hope it provides a standard candidate for researchers to evaluate their 
watermarking techniques. In future, researchers may develop stronger watermarking 
techniques by combining the advantages of different level watermarking techniques to 
prevent any IP piracy attempt from happening. 
4. Acknowledgment  
We are grateful to our work team for the contribution to this research. The Project is sponsored 
by SRF for ROCS, SEM. and Supported by Shandong Province Natural Science Foundation 
(ZR2009GL007) and A Project of Shandong Province Higher Educational Science and 
Technology Program (J09LG10). The author also thanks for the support of the family. 
5. References 
Abdel-Hamid, A.T.; Tahar, S. & El, M.A. (2003). IP watermarking techniques: survey and 
comparison. Proceedings of IWSOC2003 3rd IEEE Int. Workshop on System-on-Chip for 
www.intechopen.com
 
Performance Evaluation for IP Protection Watermarking Techniques 
 
133 
Real-Time Applications, pp.60–65, ISBN 0-7695-1944-X, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 
June 30-July 2, 2003 
Abdel-Hamid, A.T.; Tahar, S. & El Mostapha Aboulhamid. (2006). Finite state machine IP 
watermarking. Proceedings of AHS 2006 1st NASA／ESA Conference on Adaptive 
Hardware and Systems, pp.457-464, ISBN 0-7695-2614-4, Istanbul, Turkey, June 15-18, 
2006 
Adarsh, K.J. ; Lin, Y. ; Pushkin R.P.  & Gang Q. (2003). Zero overhead watermarking 
technique for FPGA designs. In GLSVLSI ’03: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Great 
Lakes symposium on VLSI, pp. 147–152, ISBN 1-58113-677-3, USA, 2003 
Aijiao, C. & Chip-Hong, C. (2006). Stego-signature at logic synthesis level for digital design 
IP protection, Proceedings of 2006 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and 
Systems, pp. 4611-4614, ISBN 0-7803-9389-9, Island of Kos, Greece, May, 2006 
Andrew, E. C.; Hyun-Jin, C.; Andrew, B. K.; Stefanus, M.; Miodrag, P.; Gang, Q. & Jennifer, 
L. W. (1999). Effective Iterative Techniques for Fingerprinting Design IP, 
Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, pp. 208-215, 
ISBN 1-58113-109-7, New York, NY, USA, 1999 
Bolotnyy, L. & Robins, G. (2007). Physically unclonable function-based security and privacy 
in RFID systems. Proceedings of PERCOM 2007 5th IEEE International Conference on 
Pervasive Computing and Communications, pp.211-220, ISBN 0-7695-2787-6, 
Washington, DC, USA, March 19-23, 2007 
Chapman, R. & Durrani, T.S. (2000). IP protection of DSP algorithms for system on chip 
implementation. IEEE Trans. on Signal Processing, vol. 48, No. 3, (March 2000), pp. 
854-86 1, ISSN 1053-587X 
Daniel, Z. & Jurgen T. (2006). Evaluation of Watermarking methods for FPGA-based IP-
cores. Technical Report 01-2006, Erlangen, Germany, Mar, 2006 
Daniel, Z. & Jurgen, T. (2010). New Directions for FPGA IP Core Watermarking and 
Identification, In Proceedings of Dagstuhl Seminar 10281, 2010 
Darko, K. & Miodrag, P. (1998). Intellectual property protection using watermarking partial 
scan chains for sequential logic test generation, Proceedings of 1998 International 
Conference on Computer-Aided Design ICCAD, 1998 
FallWorldwide Member Meeting: (1997). A Year of Achievement (Guidelines Proposed by 
VSIA Development Working Group on Intellectual Property Protection). VSI 
Alliance, Santa Clara, CA, 1997 
Gang, Q. & Miodrag, P. (1999). Effective iterative techniques for fingerprinting design IP, 
Proceedings of Design Automation Conference, pp. 587–592, ISSN 0278-0070, Los 
Angeles, CA, June, 1999 
Gang, Q. & Miodrag, P. (2003). Intellectual Property Protection in VLSI Design: Theory and 
Practice, Kluwer Academic Publishers, ISBN 978-1-4020-7320-5, USA 
Irby, D.L.; Newbould, R.D.; Carothers, J.D.; Rodriguez, J.J. & Holman, W.T. (2000). Low 
level watermarking ofVLSI designs for intellectual property protection. Proceedings 
of IEEE 13th lnt．ASlC/SOC Conferenc, pp. 136 – 140, ISBN 0-7803-6598-4, Arlington, 
VA , USA, September, 2000 
John L.; William H. M. & Miodrag P. (1998). Signature hiding techniques for FPGA 
intellectual property protection. In proceedings of ICCAD International Conference on 
Computer-Aided Design, pp. 186–189, ISBN 1-58113-008-2, California, USA, 1998 
www.intechopen.com
 
Watermarking – Volume 2 
 
134 
John L.; William H. M. & Miodrag P. (1999). Robust FPGA intellectual property protection 
through multiple small watermarks. In proceedings of DAC99 Design Automation 
Conference, pp. 831–836, ISBN 1-58113-092-9, USA, 1999 
John, L.; Miodrag P. ; William, H.M. & Miodrag, P. (2001). Fingerprinting Techniques for 
Field-programmable Gate Array Intellectual Property Protection. IEEE Transactions 
on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, Vol.20, No.10, (October 
2001), pp. 1253-1261, ISSN 0278-0070 
Kahng, A.B.; Mantik, S.; Markov, I.L.; Potkonjak, M.; Tucker, P.; Huijuan, W. & Wolfe, G. 
(1998). Robust IP watermarking methodologies for physical design. Proceedings of 
DAC 35th Design Automation Conference, pp.782-787, ISBN 0-89791-964-5, San 
Francico, California, USA, June 15-19, 1998 
Kahng, A.B.; Lach, J.; Mangione-Smith, W.H.; Mantik, S.; Markov, I.L.; Potkonjak, M.; 
Tucker, P.; Wang, H. & Wolfe, G. (1998). Watermarking techniques for intellectual 
property protection. Proceedings of DAC98 35th ACM/IEEE Design Automation 
Conference, pp. 776–781, ISBN 0-89791-964-5, San Francisco, CA, USA, June 15-19, 
1998 
Kahng, A.B.; Lach, J.; Mangione-Smith, W.H.; Mantik, S.; Markov, I.L.; Potkonjak, M.;   
Tucker, P.; Wang, H.; & Wolfe, G. (2001). Constraint-based watermarking 
techniques for design IP protection. IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of 
Integrated Circuits and Systems, Vol.e 20, No. 10, Oct. 2001, pp. 1236-1252, ISSN 0278-
0070 
Kean, T.; McLaren, D. & Marsh C. (2008). Verifying the Authenticity of Chip Designs with 
the DesignTag System. In Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Workshop on 
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, pp. 59-64, ISBN 978-1-4244-2401-6, 
Washington, USA, June, 2008 
Kirovski, D. ; Liu, D. ; Wong, J.L. & Potkonjak, M. (2000). Forensic Engineering Techniques 
for VLSI CAD Tools, Proceedings of 37th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, 
pp. 581-586, ISBN 1-58113-187-9, Los Angeles, CA, June, 2000 
Kirovski, D.; Yean-Yow Hwang; Potkonjak, M. & Cong, J. (1998). Intellectual property 
protection by watermarking combinational logic synthesis solutions. Proceedings of 
ICCAD 1998 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, pp. l94-
l98, ISBN 1-58113-008-2, San Jose, CA, USA, November 8-12, 1998 
Keating, M. & Bricaud, P. (1998). Reuse Methodology Manual for System-on-a-Chip Designs, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, ISBN 0792385586, Boston, USA, 1998 
Lach, J.; Mangione-Smith, W.H. & Potkonjak, M. (1998). FPGA Fingerprinting Techniques 
for Protecting Intellectual Property, Proceedings of the IEEE 1998 Custom Integrated 
Circuits Conference, pp. 299-302, ISBN 0-7803-4292-5, Santa Clara, CA, May, 1998 
Lin Y.; Qu, G.; Ghouti, L. & Bouridane, A. (2006). VLSI Design IP Protection: Solutions, New 
Challenges, and Opportunities, In Proceedings of Adaptive Hardware and Systems 
2006, pp. 469-476, ISBN 0-7695-2614-4, NY, USA, June 15-18, 2006 
Lin, Y.; Gang, Q. ; Lahouari, G. & Ahmed, B. (2006). VLSI design IP Protection: Solutions, 
New Challenges, and Opportunities, Proceedings of AHS 2006 1st NASA/ESA 
Conference on Adaptive Hardware and Systems, pp. 469-476, ISBN 0-7695-2614-4, 
Istanbul, Turkey, June 15-18, 2006 
www.intechopen.com
 
Performance Evaluation for IP Protection Watermarking Techniques 
 
135 
Majzoobi, M.; Koushanfar, F. & Potkonjak, M. (2008). Lightweight secure PUFs, Proceedings 
of Computer-Aided Design 2008, pp. 670-673, ISBN 978-1-4244-2819-9, San Jose, CA, 
2008 
Marsh, C. & Kean, T. (2007). A security tagging scheme for ASIC designs and intellectual 
property cores. Proceedings of IP-SoC 2006 IP Based SoC Design Conference & 
Exhibition, pp. 6-7, France, January 2007 
Min, N. & Zhiqiang G. (2004). Constraint-based watermarking technique for hard IP core 
protection in physical layout design level. Proceedings of IEEE 7 Int．Conf．on Solid-
State and Integrated Circuits Technology, pp.1360-1363, ISBN 0-7803-8511-X, Beijing, 
China, October, 2004 
Moritz, S. ; Daniel, Z. & Jurgen, T. (2008). Netlist-Level IP Protection by Watermarking for 
LUT-Based FPGAs. Proceedings of FPT 2008 International Conference on ICECE 
Technology 2008, pp. 20 -216, ISBN 978-1-4244-3783-2, Taipei, China, Dec. 2008 
Narayan, N.; Newbould, R.D.; Carothers, J.D.; Rodriguez, J.J. & Holman, W.T. (2001). IP 
Protection for VLSI Designs Via Watermarking of Routes. Proceedings of 14th Annual 
IEEE International ASIC/SOC Conference, pp.406-410, Washington, DC, USA, 
September, 2001 
Nie, T.; Kisaka, T. & Toyonaga, M. (2005). A watermarking system for IP protection by a 
post layout incremental router. Proceedings of DAC 42th Design Automation 
Conference, pp.218-221, ISBN 1-59593-058-2, San Diego, CA, USA, June 13-17, 2005 
Oliveira, A.L. (2001). Techniques for the creation of digital watermarks in sequential circuit 
designs. IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and 
Systems, VOL. 20, NO. 9, September, 2001, pp.1101-1117, ISSN 0278-0070 
Ravikanth, P.; Ben R.; Jason, T. & Neil, G. (2001). Physical One-Way Functions, PhD thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Skoric, B.; Tuyls, P. & Ophey, W. (2005). Robust key extraction from physical unclonable 
functions, Proceedings of the Applied Cryptography and Network Security Conference 
2005, pp. 407-422, ISSN 0302-9743, berlin, 2005 
Thomas, H.; Zebo, P. ; Raimund, U. ; & Manfred, G. (2001). Challenges for Future System-
on-Chip Design. Proceedings of ECCTD15th European Conference on Circuit Theory and 
Design, pp.173-176, Espoo, Finland, August 28-31, 2001 
Thomas W. & Christof P. (2003). How Secure Are FPGAs in Cryptographic Applications. In 
Proceedings of International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications 
(FPL 2003), Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 2778, pp. 91-100, Sept. 2003 
Torunoglu, I. & Charbon, E. (2000). Watermarking based copyright protection of sequential 
functions. IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits, vol. 35, No. 3, (May 1999), pp.434-440, 
ISBN 0-7803-5443-5, 2000 
Tuyls, P.; Skoric, B. ; Stallinga, S. ; Akkermans, A. & Ophey, W. (2005). Information 
theoretical security analysis of physical unclonable functions. Proceedings of 
Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2005, pp. 141-155, ISSN 0302-
9743, berlin, 2005 
Virtual Socket Interface Alliance (2000a). Intellectual Property Protection White Paper: 
Schemes, Alternatives and Discussion Version 1.0. September 2000 
Virtual Socket Interface Alliance (2000b). Virtual Component Identification Physical Tagging 
Standard (IPP 1 1.0). 2000 
www.intechopen.com
 
Watermarking – Volume 2 
 
136 
Ziener, D. & Teich, J. (2008). Power Signature Watermarking of IP Cores for FPGAs. Journal 
of Signal Processing Systems, VOL. 51, 2008, pp.123-136  
Ziener, D.; Baueregger, F.  & Teich, J. (2010). Using the Power Side Channel of FPGAs for 
Communication. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual International IEEE Sympo- sium on 
Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM 2010), pp. 237-244, ISBN 
978-0-7695-4056-6, Carolina USA, May, 2010 
www.intechopen.com
Watermarking - Volume 2
Edited by Dr. Mithun Das Gupta
ISBN 978-953-51-0619-7
Hard cover, 276 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 16, May, 2012
Published in print edition May, 2012
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
This collection of books brings some of the latest developments in the field of watermarking. Researchers from
varied background and expertise propose a remarkable collection of chapters to render this work an important
piece of scientific research. The chapters deal with a gamut of fields where watermarking can be used to
encode copyright information. The work also presents a wide array of algorithms ranging from intelligent bit
replacement to more traditional methods like ICA. The current work is split into two books. Book one is more
traditional in its approach dealing mostly with image watermarking applications. Book two deals with audio
watermarking and describes an array of chapters on performance analysis of algorithms.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Tingyuan Nie (2012). Performance Evaluation for IP Protection Watermarking Techniques, Watermarking -
Volume 2, Dr. Mithun Das Gupta (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-51-0619-7, InTech, Available from:
http://www.intechopen.com/books/watermarking-volume-2/performance-evaluation-for-ip-protection-
watermarking-techniques
© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This is an open access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
